As We See It

By DAN PATRICK

Two men, who have given profound thought to the subject, come up this week with some interesting views on the future course of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thir views don't agree in every detail but the pair — Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, and Walter Lippman, the columnist — are of the opinion that the present course of inaction and indecision is heading us toward troubled international waters.

Senator Vandenberg, who has just returned from London where he served as American delegate to the UNO conference, strikes a theme which can't possibly be very popular with the leftist liberals and fellow travelers.

In a speech to the Senate, the Michigan Republican said that we cannot hope for an improvement of our relations with the Soviet Union until we have a foreign policy that will be as firm as Russia's. Reasoned Vandenberg.

"The United States and Russia can live together in reasonable harmony if the United States speaks as plainly upon all occasions as Russia does; if the United States just as vigorously sustains its own purposes and its ideals upon all occasions as Russia does; if we abandon the miserable fiction, often encouraged by our fellow travelers, that we somehow jeopardize the peace if our candor is as firm as Russia's always is; and if we assume a moral leadership which we have too frequently allowed to lapse."

Senator Vandenberg further says that the time has come to say only what we mean and mean every word we say. He sensed at London a tendency to relapse into power politics and missed "the uplifting, crusading moral cause that seemed to imbue the earlier charter sessions at San Francisco."

Now to all this Mr. Lippman has his own solution. It primarily centers on an early European settlement and boundary fixture by the French, British, Russians and Americans. He thinks a central German government should be established as soon as possible. As a preliminary step to such a settlement, Mr. Lippman would reconstitute the American Mediterranean Fleet as a show of power and a method of preventing an upset of the present delicate balance of power in that area.

We accept a portion of Mr. Lippman's thesis with reservations and questions.

He talks about non-involvement with "reactionary and obsolete forces" in the Balkans and yet would put our fleet into the Mediterranean cauldron where international trouble has been brewed for centuries. (i.e. the Dardenelles.)

He calls upon us to strengthen the hand of Western European powers yet we are at this very moment witnessing a three power move initiated by the United States with probable British and French support to wipe out the France government in Spain.

Certainly nobody — not even the Madison Square Garden "liberals" — ever branded the Franco regime as Communist. We hold no brief for Franco but certainly any wholesale disposal of his regime at this time will pave the way for a Communist toehold on the Iberian peninsula. And that's hardly a way to strengthen Western European powers."

Perhaps the answer lies between the Vandenberg realism and the Lippman idealism.

Keen students of Soviet American relations will lose no time in seconding Senator Vandenberg's stand. There has been too much "hush-hush — we can't offend our Soviet Allies." Perhaps this attitude, reflected at times in the State Department course, has been construed as a sign of weakness and even appeasement.

And on the matter of appeasement, Mr. Lippman comes forth with the opinion that instead of recognizing the Russian situation for what it is we are — to quote Mr. Lippman — hypnotized by it. He explains:

"We are hypnotized by it when, in considering American policy, we reduce the problem, which is grave and complicated, to the question of whether we are appeasing or resisting the Russian expansion."

Mr. Lippman fears that these two extremes are dangerous and will lead only "to squandering our influence in empty gestures and ineffective words, or to our entanglement in a conflict which it is easier to get drawn into than it would be to conclude it."

Mr. Lippman attempts to define the proposed resistance to Russia as "underwriting every one who opposes the Soviets." He thinks this will get us into more trouble than its worth by involvement in China, in Southern Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans with "all manners of reactionary and obsolete forces."

He advances the proposal that the best way to stop Russian expansion is to strengthen the hand of England, the Western European powers and China, declaring:

"If it were not for the weakness of the British Empire, of Western Europe and of China, the limits of the Russian expansion would be obviously fixed and readily maintained."

STRANGE BUT TRUE

Little-Known Facts for Catholics

By M. J. MURRAY

Washington

Colmer Report Reveals Economic Score on Russia

By Tom Rogers

Washington — With the exception of the New York Times, the newspapers in this country completely ignored the Colmer report mentioned in this column last week.

There are two salient items in it that deserve to be brought to the attention of all thinking Americans.

The first is the most recent accounting on the now threadbare 'Lend-Lease.' The second and more important in view of the future, is the economic score on Russia.

Cumulative to October 1, 1945, the United Kingdom received close to 14 billion dollars in lend-lease. In return we received over four billion in materials and services. In view of the other countries' returns, the United Kingdom hasn't done too badly by us. France, though, came back handsomely, as did Australia. And a word must be said for industrious little New Zealand.

This prosperous and honest people received over $716,000,000 dollars from us in Lend-Lease. They played host to our Navy and Marines; they provided many men with a touch of home during their stay there. They offered the highest per capita fighting force of any country on either side of the last war. And they have to date paid the neck $204,000,000 of the sum leased and loaned to them!

But that is far from the complete story. Russia received close to TEN BILLION dollars in Lend-Lease. To date, Russia has returned some — get this, son — TWO MILLION dollars. Roll those sums over on your mental tongue and taste them again.

In other words, New Zealand obtained one-fiftieth of what Russia did and returned 100 times more than Russia did!

For the next few weeks there will be much Senate and House talk over England's requested loan and Russia's seldom mentioned request. The British want four billion — and have a fairly good case. The Russians want six billion — rumored preferably in machine tools — hold a Cardinal in Budapest and seek atomic secrets at the same time. Granting them even dubious political reasons for the latter two effects, how would any banker regard them as a risk on their past record?

But the picture is not complete. Russia is out to do what it failed to do. At the present time Russia is engaged in obtaining large quantities of excess stocks and equipment from Bulgaria, Roumania, Finland, Hungary, Austria and Korea. Actually, a good part of the FRENCH Renault motor works has disappeared into the Soviet lands, for the Germans had held it lock, stock, and barrel in Germany transporting it there when France fell. When the Russians came on their ally's property they recognized it as their enemies' and shipped it beyond the veil of their borders.)

With the central European countries and also with Yugoslavia and Poland, Russia has entered into extensive barter arrangements exchanging in the main industrial raw materials and fabricated products for foodstuffs and other raw materials.

At this writing the political facts of life seem to be more clear than the economic.

This much is clear: In the years before the war more than one-third of the total volume of WORLD trade consisted of exports from and imports into the countries of Europe, exclusive of Great Britain and Russia. Today and in the probable future, a great part of this will not exist except within the Russian orbit.

The oil of Austria, Roumania, and Bulgaria will flow east; the bauxite of Hungary will be translated into Russian aluminum. At this writing Russia takes two-thirds of Austria's oil for the army and the other third is bartered in Czechslovakia in return for steel that also travels east. And once it crosses the border — it is lost in a veil of secrecy.

Frankly, this may be a drive for security. Russia is tired and security may be foremost in her mind. But the political and economic and religious freedom of the peoples under her ever larger flag has vanished.

A final note: I failed to mention the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Just watch how fast the names of the other nations fade in your minds in the next few years.

China alone remains — and China is the one material power on earth that Russia fears in a long term sense. But more of that anon.

INFORMATION DESK

May Suicide Save Secrets for a Spy?

Suppose that during a war a spy or a prisoner in possession of top secrets of the government fell into the hands of the enemy. Would he be justified in committing suicide, or perhaps even be obliged to commit suicide if he were afraid that through torture he might be forced to yield the secrets and become the means of the slaughter of thousands of his countrymen?

A practical question in these days, and the answer is no.

The principle on which this answer is based is the generally-admitted but frequently-disregarded principle that we can never directly perform an evil act even for a good cause. A good end never justifies the use of a bad means.

Now suicide, by which we understand the direct and voluntary taking of one's own life on one's own authority, is evil in itself. It is forbidden by the fifth commandment which says "Thou shalt not kill." Therefore whatever means may be taken to protect such secrets in such a case, that means is definitely evil, an immoral and against the law of God, the Office of Strategic Service and its "suicide tablets" to the contrary notwithstanding. And if suicide under these or any other circumstances is forbidden by God, it is al ithe more evident that a spy cannot ever have a moral obligation to commit suicide; moral obligations come from God, and God can never oblige us to do what is wrong. Let no spy ever fear, therefore, for any evil effects which may follow.

What should a spy do in this case if he cannot protect his secrets by suicide? Note well, that we do not deny that he has a duty to preserve those secrets by all moral means, even to submitting to death at the hands of the enemy. Well, in the first place the Catholic spy should first of all ask God to help him not to betray the secrets. Why shouldn't God, the strength of martyrs, grant this request, when the spy is engaged in the good cause of defending his native land? In the second place, although he cannot secure his own death, he is morally justified in performing a good act which may have two effects, first a good effect, second, an evil effect, so long as the evil effect is merely a by-product of the good effect. Thus he could, when captured, avail himself of any possible means of escape from his captors, even though he realized that there was an equal chance of his being shot and perhaps killed by the guards. In this case the direct objective of his good act would be the escape and preservation of the secrets; the indirect effect, not intended by him, would be his being killed, in which case also the possibility of further betrayal of the secrets would be prevented. He would be much like the brave Captain Oates of the Scott Antarctic expedition who, when there was only enough food left for three, placing the welfare of his companions before his own, walked out of the tent into the Antarctic cold although he realized that the undesirable effect of such an act would certainly be his own death.

But never can we be justified, even to save the whole world, in committing one single voluntary sin, even venial.

Is it a sin for a woman to escape an assault upon her honor?

The principle involved here is the same as that involved in the preceding case. Because suicide in itself is forbidden by God, such a woman would be committing a sin to prevent the sin being committed. The good that she would accomplish by the prevention of the physical violation and the possible pregnancy is not sufficient reason to it, since evil cannot be done that good may come of it. Only when evil means to accomplish that good end.

More again, however, although she cannot take her life directly, she may make use of the principle of double effect referred to above. That is, she may use some means or accept which has as its primary effect a good effect, but which may have a bad effect as a by-product. Thus, for instance, she might accept the risk of jumping from a high window. In this case the intention would be to escape sin, the fact that jumping would not in itself be certain and even though her death or severe injury might be a foreseeable by-product of the jump, that evil effect would be by no means intended.

This is a classical explanation of the [illegible] solution of such a problem. [illegible] a practical one and it is certainly [illegible] The main thing to be borne in mind [illegible] the woman involved must [illegible] so much the forced consummation [illegible] but her own consent to such an [illegible] internal consent which makes [illegible]

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